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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION/ 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
The appellants (Atkinsons) filed a lawsuit against IHC 
Hospitals, Inc. (IHC), Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. (Wetzel), and 
Scott Olsen (Olsen), claiming inter alia, fraud and 
misrepresentations as to a Settlement Agreement which was reached 
in connection with injuries apparently sustained by Chad Atkinson. 
Atkinsons also sued Stephen G. Morgan (Morgan) and the 
law firm of Morgan, Scalley & Reading for legal malpractice. 
The lower court granted summary judgment to all 
defendants. The court also denied Atkinsons' motion to file an 
Amended Compliant. 
This is an appeal from the lower court's granting of 
summary judgment to all defendants and denying Atkinsons' Motion 
to Amend the Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issue presented for review as to Scott Wetzel 
Services, Inc. and its manager Scott Olsen is: 
Whether the lower court properly granted summary 
judgment to Wetzel and Olsen, dismissing 
Atkinson's Complaint. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Const. Art. I § 11 
Utah Const. Art. I § 24 
U.S. Const. Amend XIV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Atkinsons' minor son, Chad Atkinson, suffered 
permanent injury while a patient at Primary Children's Medical 
Center on or about March 4, 1983. The Atkinsons entered into a 
Settlement Agreement with IHC that was negotiated on IHC's behalf 
by Scott Olsen (hereinafter Olsen), manager of Scott Wetzel 
Services, Inc. Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. (hereinafter Wetzel) 
was retained by IHC to adjust IHC's insurance claims. The 
Atkinsons now claim the settlement was inadequate, and they filed 
a complaint on July 26, 1987. 
The sections of the Atkinsons' Complaint which apply to 
Wetzel and Olsen are Counts I and II. Counts I and II state that 
IHC, its claims adjuster Wetzel and Wetzel's employee, Olsen, were 
guilty of fraud or negligent misrepresentation because these 
respondents allegedly misrepresented Chad's condition in procuring 
the settlement agreement. 
In Count III the Atkinsons complain that Stephen G. 
Morgan and his law firm Morgan, Scalley & Reading are guilty of 
legal malpractice. 
Count IV seeks a declaratory judgment that IHC must cover 
certain institutionalization and therapy costs, and Count V asks 
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for a declaration that the Atkinsons could sue other joint 
tort-feasors despite a specific prohibition in the settlement 
agreement. 
All defendants filed motions for summary judgment. Judge 
David Young of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah granted defendants' motions and denied 
Atkinsons' motion to amend their complaint to allow a claim for 
medical malpractice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Chad Atkinson was born on March 2, 1983. (R.3) 
2. Roger and Polly Atkinson are the parents and 
guardians ad litem of Chad Atkinson. (R. 2, 20-23) 
3. Plaintiffs Roger and Polly Atkinson sought 
appointment as conservators and guardians of Chad Atkinson to 
enable them to settle Chad Atkinson's claims against Primary 
Children's Medical Center. (R. 421) 
4. The court-approved appointment of Roger and Polly 
Atkinson and approval of the settlement agreement followed at 
least five separate meetings directly involving Roger and Polly 
Atkinson, Roger's father, a Primary Children's Medical Center 
Administrator, and Scott Olsen. (R. 653 at 31-50) 
5. Scott Olsen (Olsen) is the general manager of Scott 
Wetzel Services, Inc. (Wetzel), a company that is an insurance 
adjuster for and agent of IHC. Olsen is also an agent of IHC. 
6. The end result of the negotiations was a complete 
financial package covering Chad Atkinson's medical care, education 
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and general damages, with additional money going to Roger and 
Polly Atkinson for their expenses and time. (R. 415-418) 
7. Roger and Polly Atkinson, with parental support, 
actively participated in negotiating a settlement. By May 27, 
1983 Primary Children's Medical Center had admitted it felt 
responsible for Chad's condition. (R. 4 at 1f 16) Wetzel's 
manager, Olsen, on behalf of Primary Children's Medical Center, 
made the Atkinsons an offer. (R. 619 - Exhibit 7 to Deposition of 
George Atkinson) Roger and Polly Atkinson discussed the proposal 
with their parents. (R. 648 at pp. 14-22; R. 649 at pp. 9-11; 
R. 646 at pp. 15-57; R. 651 at pp. 6-48) Roger's father then 
assisted Roger and Polly in putting together a ten-page 
counter-proposal. (R. 646-653) After several more meetings, an 
agreement was reached. (R. 415-420) 
8. After the agreement was reached, Olsen contacted 
attorney Morgan and requested that Morgan, on behalf of IHC, 
present the Settlement Agreement to the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for approval 
required under state law in all settlements involving minors. (R. 
156; R.647, p. 116-117; R. 644, p. 112) 
9. Judge Fishier, after questioning Roger and Polly 
Atkinson, approved the Settlement Agreement. (R. 189-196) 
10. The agreement provided that IHC, Primary Children's 
Medical Center, and their agents were to be released from claims 
arising out of the March 4, 1983 incident wherein Chad had 
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undergone oxygen deprivation and suffered brain damage. The 
agreement also stated plainly that Chad's injury might be 
permanent. (R. 415-420). 
11. Prior to the settlement hearing, the Atkinsons had 
the agreement read aloud to them by Morgan, and the Atkinsons told 
him they understood his explanation. (R. 652 at pp. 19-28, 30, 
38) . 
12. Because the extent of Chad Atkinson's damages was 
uncertain, the agreement was based on Roger and Polly Atkinson's 
assessment of Chad's condition, not upon any representations made 
by defendants. (R. 415-420) 
13. Roger and Polly Atkinson were invited to have Chad 
evaluated by specialists in Phoenix, Arizona at IHC's expense to 
determine the exact nature of Chad's injuries. They declined the 
offer. (R. 646 at p. 50) 
14. Roger and Polly Atkinson were aware before the 
settlement was approved by the court that Chad Atkinson had 
suffered brain damage. (R. 203 attached for convenience in 
Addendum to this Brief as Transcript of July 22, 1983 Court 
Proceeding) 
15. Roger and Polly Atkinson were apprised by the court 
at the time the settlement agreement was approved, that entering 
into the settlement agreement would prohibit them from suing IHC 
or any of its agents if Chad's condition later took a turn for the 
worse. (R. 203, 204) 
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16. Roger and Polly were aware on July 22, 1983 that the 
guaranteed payout of the settlement agreement was about $900,000 
plus medical expenses, rather than $3 million. (R. 205, 206) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY THE COURT-APPROVED RELEASE. 
A. The Release Applies To Scott Wetzel, Inc. And Scott Olsen 
As Agents Of IHC. 
By signing the court-approved release, plaintiffs agreed 
to "forever discharge IHC [and its] agents." According to Utah 
law, Wetzel and Olsen are agents of IHC. In adjusting IHC's 
insurance claims, Wetzel and Olsen act in behalf of IHC. They are 
entrusted with the business of IHC. In addition, IHC as principal 
exerts control over the means by which the end result is obtained, 
in the form of specific requirements and procedures to which 
Wetzel and Olsen must adhere as set out in the employment 
contract. It would be anomalous to release the alleged principal 
tortfeasor (IHC) while simultaneously holding its insurance 
adjusters liable. Thus, the release bars claims against Wetzel 
and Olsen because they are agents of IHC. 
B. The Undisputed Trial Transcript Documents The Fact That 
Plaintiffs Knew Chad Suffered Brain Damage As A Result 
Of The March 1983 Incident And Therefore The Release Was 
Not Obtained By Fraud Or Misrepresentation. 
The release, which was read and signed by the Atkinsons, 
states plainly that Chad Atkinson had sustained injury and that 
the injury was or might be permanent and progressive. The release 
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also states unequivocally that plaintiffs agreed to release all 
future claims against IHC and its agents arising out of the 1983 
incident. Furthermore, the Atkinsons represented the condition of 
their child before Judge Fishier as "brain damaged." In addition, 
when the court asked the Atkinsons if they understood that signing 
the release would prevent them from bringing more claims against 
IHC and its agents, even if Chad's condition worsened, the 
Atkinson's responded that they understood. 
C. The Court-Approved Release Applies To Plaintiffs' Claims 
For Misrepresentation And Fraud And Hence Bars This 
Complaint. 
Plaintiffs assert that, because theirs is not a medical 
malpractice claim, the release does not apply. Plaintiffs 
misconstrue the language of the release by such a narrow 
construction. The release applies to "any and all claims . . . on 
account of or in any way growing out of . . . injuries . . . 
resulting from the accident." Plaintiffs' complaint for fraud and 
misrepresentation is based upon the condition of Chad Atkinson, 
which resulted from the accident in 1983. The release precisely 
includes the current complaint. This action is therefore barred. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE 
DEFENDANTS BECAUSE APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS BAR 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT. 
A. The Two Year Statute Of Limitations Of The Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act Bars Plaintiffs' Action. 
Plaintiffs' claims for fraud and misrepresentation fall 
within the definition of "malpractice action against a health care 
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provider" in the two-year medical malpractice statute of 
limitations because both claims arise out of or are related to the 
health care rendered to Chad Atkinson on March 4, 1983. 
Plaintiffs were told about Chad's injury on March 4, 1983 
and on numerous occasions until the date of the settlement hearing 
(July 22, 1983). They declined to have him tested further. They 
knew or should have known that they suffered a legal injury, but 
did not bring suit until July of 1987. That complaint was two 
years too late and hence is barred. 
B. The Two Year Statute Of Limitations Applies To Scott 
Wetzel, Inc. And Scott Olsen Because They Are Health 
Care Providers As Defined In The Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. 
The definition of "health care provider" in the Act 
includes agents of those rendering health care. Wetzel and its 
manager Olsen are agents of IHC. In accordance with Utah law, 
Wetzel and Olsen have an agency relationship with IHC because IHC 
exerts control over the means of obtaining the contracted-for end 
result of a settlement. See Point I.A of this Brief. In addition, 
the Legislature wished to restrict the period and scope of medical 
tort claims. To allow a claim against mere agents of the alleged 
principal tortfeasor six years after the fact would contravene the 
legislative purpose. 
C. The Three Year Statute Of Limitations Covering Claims 
Of Fraud Or Mistake Also Bars Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
Assuming arguendo that the claims for misrepresentation 
and fraud have some merit, under Utah law the limitations period 
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begins to run at the time of discovery of the fraud. Under the 
undisputed facts the Atkinsons' complaint is barred because it was 
filed over a year too late. 
The transcript of the Court Approval hearing with Judge 
Fishier held on July 22, 1983 demonstrates that Polly and Roger 
Atkinson knew that Chad had suffered brain damage. In response to 
a specific question, when the court asked what was wrong with 
Chad, Polly replied, "Brain damage." 
If Wetzel or Olsen ever misrepresented Chad's condition 
by indicating that Chad had not sustained brain damage, plaintiffs 
would have known this to be untrue by July 22, 1983 (the date of 
the settlement hearing). Plaintiffs should have filed their 
complaint on or before July 22, 1986. They did not file until 
July 26, 1987, over a year too late. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL. 
The issue of adequate damages was settled by Judge 
Fishier's court order stating that the Atkinsons were authorized 
to accept the settlement offer and that the settlement was fair. 
Plaintiffs now seek to relitigate the adequacy of the settlement. 
Their complaint is barred by the application of the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. 
A. All Four Elements Of The Prevailing Test For Applying 
The Doctrine Of Collateral Estoppel Are Satisfied. 
First, the issue in both actions is identical, i.e. 
whether certain damages are sufficient to cover Chad's condition. 
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Second, there was a final judgment, in the form of a court order, 
regarding the settlement offer and the release contained therein. 
Third, Wetzel and Olsen are privies to IHC in the prior action in 
which the issue of damages was decided. Fourth and finally, the 
issue of appropriate damages was competently, fully, and fairly 
resolved. Plaintiffs were present in the courtroom after having 
participated in extensive negotiations, and engaged in investiga-
tive dialogue with the court; therefore, the requirements of 
sufficient notice and opportunity to present objections were 
fulfilled. The court found the settlement to be fair "in all 
respects." The issue of adequate damages should not be relitigated. 
B. The Doctrine Of Collateral Estoppel May Be Applied To 
Final Judgments Based On Settlement Agreements. 
The law, favoring settlement agreements over litigation, 
recognizes that a settlement agreement is final, conclusive, and 
as binding as if its terms were embodied in judgment. Hence, 
plaintiffs' unsupported assertion that only issues determined 
after a lengthy trial are subject to collateral estoppel is 
erroneous. Consonant with judicial policy towards settlement 
agreements, an issue formerly resolved should be barred from 
relitigation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT IS BARRED BY THE COURT-APPROVED RELEASE 
It is undisputed that plaintiffs negotiated an agreement 
with defendant IHC which was approved by the Third Judicial 
District Court. That agreement prohibits this action: 
Hereby on their own behalf and on behalf of 
their minor child, Chad Atkinson, and their heirs, 
executors, administrators, successors and assigns 
release, acquit and forever discharge Intermountain 
Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Children's 
Medical Center or their agents, servants, 
successors, heirs, executors, administrators, of 
and from any and all claims, actions, causes of 
actions, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of 
service, expenses and compensation whatsoever, 
which the undersigns or their minor child, Chad 
Atkinson, now have or which may hereafter acc[ru]e 
on account of or in any way growing out of any and 
all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen 
bodily and personal injuries and property damage in 
the consequences thereof resulting or to result 
from the accident, casualty or event which occurred 
on or about the 4th day of March, 1983, at the 
Primary Children's Medical Center. (R. 416) 
A. The Release Applies To Scott Wetzel, Inc. And Scott Olsen 
As Agents Of IHC. 
Plaintiffs agreed to "forever discharge Intermountain 
Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Children's Medical Center 
or their agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors, 
administrators, of and from any and all claims . . .." Jd-' P- 2 
(emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs contend that Wetzel and its employee Olsen do 
not fall within the scope of the release because they are 
independent contractors. In accordance with the prevailing 
standards for differentiating an agent from a non-agent, however, 
Wetzel and Olsen are agents of IHC and therefore the release 
applies and bars this claim. 
An "agent" is one who acts for or in place of another by 
authority from him or one who is entrusted with business of 
another. Victorio Realty Group, Inc. v. Ironwood IX, 713 P.2d 
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424 (Colo. 1985). According to Utah law, the crucial distinguish-
ing feature between an agent and a non-agent relationship is the 
extent to which the principal (IHC) maintains control over the 
performance of the secondary actor. If the principal controls or 
commands only the end result, the secondary actor is deemed an 
independent contractor. If, however, the employer exercises 
control over the means of accomplishing the result, the indication 
is toward an agent relationship. See Thiokol Chemical Corporation 
v. Peterson, 393 P.2d 391 (Utah 1964). 
The manner in which the parties designate a relationship 
is not controlling on the issue of whether an agent or independent 
contractor relationship has been created; if an act done by one 
person on behalf of another is in its essential nature one of 
agency, the one is the agent of the other, notwithstanding that he 
is not so called. Chevron Oil Company v. Sutton, 515 P.2d 1283, 
1285 (N.M. 1973). Courts have also recognized that a person may 
be both an independent contractor and an agent for another. See, 
e.g. First National Bank and Trust Company of Oklahoma City v. 
Sidwell Corporation, 678 P.2d 118, 124 (Kan. 1984). 
As defined by these guidelines, Wetzel and Olsen are 
agents of IHC. By mutual assent, IHC mandated in its contract 
with Wetzel and Olsen that the latter would adjust IHC's insurance 
claims. The contract states that Wetzel "shall represent and act 
for IHC in matters pertaining to the general, professional, and 
workers' compensation liabilities of IHC for claims based on 
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events which occur during the term or terms of this Agreement." 
(See Addendum to this Brief.) 
Pursuant to this directive, IHC set up numerous and 
specific duties for which Wetzel is responsible. Those duties 
include: creating files for and investigating the validity of all 
claims, determining proper benefits due, making payments, defending 
non-compensable claims, and filing appropriate information to 
government agencies. At all times Wetzel acts in place of IHC, or 
in its behalf, not simply as an independent actor who may construct 
a project as he pleases so long as the end result is obtained. 
In addition, IHC maintains a significant amount of 
control over Wetzel's activity. As stipulated in the contract, 
Wetzel must make "timely payment of benefits due in accord with 
payment procedures established. . .by IHC." IHC provides and 
controls all the money utilized to settle claims. Wetzel must 
"assist selected (by IHC) legal counsel in preparation of cases 
for hearings, appeals, and/or trial." Wetzel must provide 
pertinent data on all claims to IHC; it also must provide loss 
reports in a tailored format. Finally, Wetzel must "provide . . . 
IHC such reports as (IHC) may reasonably require." (Emphasis 
added) (See Addendum to this Brief.) 
These well-defined duties of Wetzel to a substantially 
involved IHC demonstrate that, for the purpose of the release 
which bars this claim, Wetzel and Olsen are agents of IHC. 
Although plaintiffs allege that Wetzel and Olsen are 
independent contractors, and hence not included in the release, 
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there are three countervailing considerations which refute 
plaintiffs' argument. First, it would be anomalous to release the 
alleged principal tortfeasor (in this case, IHC) from claims 
arising out of the March 1983 incident while simultaneously 
holding a mere insurance adjuster liable. Second, even if the 
parties themselves designate the relationship as one of 
independent contracor, this designation is not controlling. See 
Chevron Oil Company, supra. What is important is the extent to 
which IHC controls Wetzel's activity, and as pointed out above, 
there is specific and continous oversight on the part of IHC. 
Third, given that an independent contractor may also be an agent 
(see First National Bank and Trust Company of Oklahoma, supra), 
and taking into account the fact that IHC controls all the money 
and many of the settlement procedures, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the release intended to include all types of 
affiliated, secondary actors in the March 1983 incident. 
Therefore, this claim against Wetzel and Olsen is barred. 
B. The Undisputed Hearing Transcript Documents The Fact 
That Plaintiffs Knew Chad Suffered Brain Damage As 
A Result Of The Incident In March Of 1983, And 
Therefore The Release Was Not Obtained By Fraud. 
In an attempt to escape the plain language of the 
release, plaintiffs allege on appeal that Wetzel and Olsen 
misrepresented the seriousness of Chad's condition. Plaintiffs 
assert these misrepresentations caused them to settle the claim. 
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The undisputed facts, however, demonstrate that the 
Atkinsons knew their child had sustained brain damage. Contained 
in the Court Transcript of Hearing, July 22, 1983 is the following: 
THE COURT: Do you believe you have a claim 
against Intermountain Health Care? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: What's the nature of the child's 
injury? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Brain damage. 
* * * * * * * 
THE COURT: Do you believe that you, on behalf of 
the child, have a claim against 
Intermountain Health Care? 
MR. ATKINSON: Yes, I do. 
Pages 2-4. (A copy of the transcript is provided for the 
convenience of this Court at Addendum to this Brief.) 
The other facts show how plaintiffs gained this 
understanding. The following is taken from Deposition of 
Dr. Michael Matlak: 
A: I can remember taking to Dad [Roger 
Atkinson] on the telephone after Chad had 
his episode of near cardiac arrest . . . 
Q: What did you tell Mr. Atkinson? 
A: I told him that his child's breathing tube 
had become plugged and with that that Chad 
had a life threatening condition because of 
the fact that we were having trouble 
breathing for him and that his heart rate 
had slowed down and that we were concerned 
that he had a lack of oxygen during that 
period of time . . . (p. 19) 
* * * * * * * * 
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Okay, could you tell me about another 
conversation that you specifically recall? 
I think I can recall that when Mr. Atkinson 
came over with either his mother or his 
mother-in-law that at the bedside we talked 
about Chad's condition. 
And what did you tell her? 
I told them what I just told you when you 
asked about the March 3rd or March 4th episode 
What did Mr. Atkinson say? 
I don't recall . . . other than remembering 
that they were upset and concerned about the 
condition of their child. (p. 20) 
* * * * * * * * * 
Did you ever in any conversation with Chad's 
family members understate the severity of his 
condition or in any way withhold information 
from them? 
Not at all. (p. 63) 
* * * * * * * * * 
om Deposition of Dr. Joel Thompson: 
At this conversation [with the Atkinsons prior 
to Chad's discharge from the hospital] did you 
tell Roger and Polly that the child had brain 
damage? 
I indicated there was brain damage and that 
the problems that he had, the seizures and so 
forth were the result of the brain not working 
the way it should. (p. 11) 
Did you tell Roger and Polly that the brain 
damage could be permanent? 
Yes. (p. 12) 
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Q: To the best of your knowledge have you ever at 
any time understated in conversations with any 
of the Atkinson family members Chad's 
condition or prospects of ultimate outcome? 
A: No, sir. (p. 37) 
In addition to knowing the bare fact that Chad had 
suffered brain damage, plaintiffs also knew that the injury might 
be permanent and severe. The uncontested content of the release, 
which the Atkinsons read, had explained to them, and signed, 
states: 
The undersigneds hereby declare and represent 
that the injuries sustained by Chad Atkinson are or 
may be permanent and progressive and that recovery 
therefrom is uncertain and indefinite . . . (R. 417) 
Furthermore, it is undisputed that the court clarified and 
questioned plaintiffs about the issue: 
THE COURT: Do you understand that by settling 
this case, and regardless of what 
later transpires, when you find out 
later that the child's injury is 
worse than you anticipated, and on 
the other hand even if it's better, 
that you will not ever be able to 
come back against Intermountain 
Health Care? Do you understand that? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes, sir, I do. 
Transcript at p. 2 (see Addendum to this Brief). 
Plaintiffs represented to the Court, and signed documents 
to the effect that they understood both that Chad was brain 
damaged and that the injury might be permanent and progressive. 
In addition to paying for all medical expenses, both past and 
future, IHC agreed to pay plaintiffs nearly a million dollars over 
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the course of Chad Atkinson's life. In return plaintiffs agreed 
to release all claims against IHC and its agents. The trial court 
correctly upheld the release and correctly granted summary 
judgment for the defendants Wetzel and Olsen. 
C. The Court-Approved Release Applies to Plaintiffs' 
Claims for Misrepresentation and Fraud and Hence 
Bars this Complaint. 
Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the plain language of the 
release by asserting that, because theirs is not a medical 
malpractice claim, the release does not apply. The language of 
the court-approved, signed release, however, is not limited to 
medical malpractice actions: 
[The undersigneds Polly and Roger Atkinson, on 
behalf of their minor child, do hereby] acquit 
and forever discharge Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., . . . or their agents . . . of and from any 
and all claims, actions, causes of action, 
demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of service, 
expenses and compensation whatsoever, which the 
undersigneds or their minor child, Chad Atkinson, 
now have or which may hereafter accrue on account 
of or in any way growing out of any and all known 
and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and 
personal injuries and property damage and the 
consequences thereof resulting or to result from 
the accident, casualty or event which occurred on 
or about the 4th day of March, 1983, at the 
Primary Children's Medical Center. (emphasis 
added) 
(R. 416) The plaintiffs' complaint for fraud and misrepresenta-
tion is based upon the allegation that Chad's condition was worse 
than it appeared; that Olsen (among other defendants) knew or 
should have known this fact, and hence that plaintiffs now deserve 
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further compensation for Chad's injury. The release prohibits the 
current claim. Plaintiffs' action is a simple example of 
precisely that which the release intended to bar: further 
recovery based on claims arising out of or resulting from the 
March 1983 incident. The plaintiffs' entire case in Counts I and 
II is based upon the condition of Chad Atkinson which resulted 
from the accident in 1983. As such, the release applies. 
Summary judgment, granted because the uncontested facts 
demonstrate that the court-approved release bars plaintiffs' 
complaint, should be upheld. 
II, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE 
DEFENDANTS BECAUSE APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION BAR 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT. 
A. The Two Year Statute of Limitations Of The Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act Bars Plaintiffs' Action. 
Plaintiffs' complaint against Wetzel and Olsen is barred 
by U.C.A. § 78-14-4, which states in pertinent part: 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs, . . . 
Plaintiffs' claims for fraud (Count I) and negligent 
misrepresentation (Count II) fall within the definition of 
"malpractice action against a health care provider" as set out in 
§ 78-14-3 U.C.A.: 
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(29) "Malpractice action against a health 
care provider" means any action against a health 
care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach 
of warranty, wrongful death or otherwise, based 
upon alleged personal injuries relating to or 
arising out of health care rendered or which 
should have been rendered by the health care 
provider. (emphasis supplied) 
The plain language of the statute includes plaintiffs' 
alleged claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. First, 
the claim of fraud is based upon the allegation that Wetzel and 
Olsen intentionally concealed the condition of Chad Atkinson. The 
condition of Chad Atkinson arose from the health care rendered to 
him in March of 1983; therefore the claim for fraud falls within 
the scope of the statute. Second, all claims of negligent 
misrepresentation regarding the condition of Chad are also 
included in the statute's definition because those claims, in an 
identical fashion, relate to or arise from health care rendered on 
March 4, 1983. Therefore, both the fraud and misrepresentation 
claims, which turn upon Chad's condition after the alleged 
malpractice, are barred by the two-year statute of limitations 
because both directly relate to or arise out of the incident that 
occurred on March 4, 1983. 
In addition, the legislature evidenced intent to include 
fraud by delineating an additionally limiting time period of one 
year during which plaintiffs must file all claims seeking damages 
for fraudulent concealment of medical malpractice. [U.C.A. 
§ 78-14-4(l)(b>] 
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Whether the one-or-two-year period of limitations is 
applied, the Utah standard governing what commences the running of 
the statute is the same: The statute begins to run when an 
injured person knows or should know that he has suffered a legal 
injury. Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979). Further, 
when a plaintiff is aware of facts that would lead a reasonable 
person to conclude that he may have a cause of action against a 
health care provider, the statute of limitations begins to run. 
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on 
other grounds, 801 F.2d 368. The reasonable awareness threshold 
which starts the statute of limitations running also applies to 
actions on behalf of minors, where the party seeking a cause of 
action does so as guardian ad litem. Hargett v. Limberg, supra. 
Polly and Roger Atkinson were notified about the incident 
that occurred on March 4, 1983. (R. 645 at pp. 19, 20, 63; R 650 
at pp. 11, 12) The doctors, and Olsen, told the plaintiffs that 
their child had suffered oxygen deprivation from a blocked 
breathing tube and brain damage. Most importantly, at the time of 
the hearing, the court informed Polly and Roger Atkinson about the 
value of the settlement and Chad's condition, and they responded 
that they understood. (R. 203-208) It is also undisputed that 
Olsen offered to pay for additional tests for Chad before the 
settlement agreement was drawn up, but the plaintiffs declined the 
offer. (R. 646 at p. 50) 
Plaintiffs knew their child had suffered oxygen 
deprivation. They knew that the doctors and Olsen had told them 
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of Chad's brain damage. In fact, the Atkinsons even apprised the 
Court about their child's injury; Polly Atkinson informed the 
court that her child was "Brain-damaged." By all standards of 
reasonability, if a claim such as the present one existed, 
plaintiffs knew or should have known at that time 
(March 4-July 22, 1983). 
Plaintiffs did not file this suit until July 26, 1987, 
far too late for either the one-or two-year limitations period set 
out in the Utah Malpractice Act. 
B. The Two Year Statute of Limitations Applies To Scott 
Wetzel, Inc., And Scott Olsen Because They Are Health 
Care Providers As Defined In The Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. 
The term "health care provider" is defined in Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act: 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Health care provider" includes any 
person, partnership, association, corporation, or 
other facility or institution who causes to be 
rendered or who renders health care or 
professional services as a hospital, . . . and 
others rendering similar care and services 
relating to or arising out of the health needs of 
persons or groups of persons, and officers, 
employees, or agents of any of the above acting 
in the course and scope of their employment. 
§ 78-14-3, Utah Code Annotated (emphasis supplied). Pursuant to 
an employment contract and according to Utah law, Wetzel and Scott 
Olsen are agents of defendant IHC. See I.A of this Brief. 
In addition, plaintiffs' allegation that the two-year 
statute of limitations does not apply to Wetzel and Olsen produces 
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anomalous results and contravenes the stated legislative purpose 
of the Act. By enacting a two-year statute of limitations, the 
legislature wished to make the time in which claims could be 
brought reasonable but predictably limited to a specific period. 
(§ 78-14-2 Utah Code Ann.). It also wished to encourage early 
settlement and to counteract skyrocketing insurance rates. Jd. 
Plaintiffs argue, in effect, that although claims against IHC may 
be barred by the two-year statute of limitations, its mere agents 
are not so protected. In so contending, plaintiffs emasculate the 
very purpose of the statute and unreasonably broaden its scope. 
Just as claims against IHC are barred, so are those against Wetzel 
and 01sen. 
C. The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act And Its Statute 
Of Limitations Are Constitutionally Sound. 
Appellants claim that application of the two-year medical 
malpractice statute of limitations to the Atkinson's claim would 
deprive minor Chad of his constitutional right to an open court 
and to equal treatment and protection under the law. A review of 
pertinent case law will show that Utah courts which have tested 
the constitutionality of the Act under the theories raised by 
appellants have rejected the same constitutional arguments which 
appellants now assert. 
In reaching its decision to uphold Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-14-4, the Court can rely on a long line of Utah Supreme Court 
decisions which have strongly and consistently upheld the 
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provisions of the Health Care Malpractice Act, including its 
statute of limitations, against constitutional challenges. See, 
e.g., Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 
1981); Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 
1980); McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786 
(Utah 1979); Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978). 
Federal courts reviewing constitutional challenges to the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act have also uniformly upheld the 
validity of § 78-14-4. See, e.g., Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 600 
(10th Cir. 1983). 
This Court's decision in Allen v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., supra, is typical of the support the Court has given 
to enactments by the Utah Legislature in the area of medical 
malpractice. In Allen the Court unanimously rejected the 
plaintiff's argument that the shortened statute of limitations for 
medical malpractice cases violates constitutional guarantees of 
equal protection. The Court held that: (1) the Utah "legislature 
exercised its discretionary prerogative in determining that the 
shortening of the statute of limitations . . . would insure the 
continued availability of health care services,"; and (2) such 
action does not exceed constitutional prohibitions. 635 P.2d at 
32 (footnote omitted). 
Appellants implicitly acknowledge that the Legislature 
may rationally limit the time for filing malpractice claims as to 
adults, but argue it may not so limit minors' claims. Appellants' 
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argument overlooks, however, the principle that the legislature 
may place minors on equal footing with adults without infringing 
their constitutional rights. As explained in Vance v. Vance, 108 
U.S. 514 (1883): 
The Constitution of the United States . . . gives 
to minors no special rights beyond others, and it 
is within the legislative competency of the State 
. . . to make exceptions in their favor or not. 
The exemptions from the operation of statutes of 
limitation, usually accorded to infants and 
married women, do not rest upon any general 
doctrine of the law that they cannot be subjected 
to their action, but in every instance upon 
express language in those statutes giving them 
time after majority . . . to assert their rights. 
Id. at 521. See also Grellet v. City of New York, 504 N.Y.S.2d 
671, 673 (A.D.2 Dept. 1986) (medical malpractice action not tolled 
by plaintiff's infancy); Licano v. Karusnick, 663 P.2d 1066, 1068 
(Colo. App. 1983) (the legislature is the primary judge of whether 
the time period allowed to a minor is reasonable); Rohrabaugh v. 
Wagoner, 413 N.E.2d 891, 893 (Ind. 1980) (legislature is not under 
any constitutional mandate to suspend operation of statutes of 
limitation in cases of infancy or incapacity); 51 AM.JUR.2d 750, 
Limitation of Actions § 182 (1970) (minority does not per se 
bestow immunity upon an infant or his guardian without a 
legislative saving in his favor, and a statute of limitations will 
ordinarily run against the claims of infants in the absence of a 
contrary statute). 
This principle was reaffirmed by the decision of the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah in Harqett 
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v. Limberq, supra. In that decision the federal court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant health care providers, 
holding that the minor plaintiff's claim was barred by the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations. In doing so the court 
considered and rejected the same constitutional attack the 
appellants have launched in their brief. The court's opinion 
recognizes as "universally accepted" the rule that a "legislature 
may put adults and infants on the same footing with respect to 
statutes of limitation without affecting constitutional rights." 
Id. at 156. 
Other federal courts have reached the same conclusion 
with respect to operation of the statute of limitations against 
minors' claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See, e.g., 
Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971, 972 (10th Cir. 1980) ("It 
is well established that a claimant's minority does not toll the 
running of the statute of limitations under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act"); Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d 578, 579 (9th Cir. 
1965) (minority does not toll the statute of limitations, and 
parents or guardians of a minor must preserve a claim by timely 
action); Pittman v. United States, 341 F.2d 739, 741 (9th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965) (equal protection guarantees are 
not violated by applying a shortened statute of limitations to a 
minor * s claim). 
Sound state and federal case precedents clearly show that 
the statute of limitations of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
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Act, which places adults and minors on equal footing, is a 
constitutional exercise of legislative prerogative and a rational 
response to the stated legislative purpose of addressing a crisis 
in the availability of medical malpractice insurance and its 
attendant effect upon the quality of health care in the State of 
Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1977). 
D. Section 78-14-4 Is A Constitutionally Permissible 
Enactment. 
A party who challenges a legislative enactment on 
constitutional grounds bears a heavy burden of proof. Judicial 
review of a properly enacted law begins with the strong presumption 
that the law is constitutional. State v. Murphy, 674 P.2d 1220, 
1222 (Utah 1983). This Court has consistently observed that it is 
not the function of the judiciary to second guess the wisdom of 
legislation. 
But the wisdom or propriety of the legislation is 
not for us to consider . . . "there is, without 
doubt, plenty of room, within the pale of the 
Constitution, for ill-advised legislation. . . . 
That is a matter between the people and the 
representatives." . . . Within the limits of the 
Constitution it is the prerogative of the 
legislature to control such matters, and the fact 
that an act may be ill-advised or unfortunate, if 
such it be, does not give rise to an appeal from 
the Legislature to the courts for correction 
. . . that each branch thereof avoid 
infringement upon the prerogatives of the other. 
Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement Sys. Bd. of Admin., 246 P.2d 
591, 599 (Utah 1952) [citations omitted]; see also Minnesota v. 
Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). By judicial mandate 
-27-
this court must not interfere with the Legislature's exercise of 
its prerogative unless a constitutional infringement is clearly 
established. Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1981). 
1. Standard of Review. 
Appellants' challenge the constitutionality of § 78-14-4 
as applied to minors on two grounds: (1) the provision violates 
guarantees of equal protection of laws found within the United 
States and Utah Constitutions; and (2) the provision violates 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution relating to a 
litigant's right of access to the courts. In concurrence with 
plaintiffs' brief on this issue, the rational basis standard of 
review is the appropriate standard for deciding both of 
appellants' constitutional challenges. See Malan v. Lewis, 693 
P.2d 661, 674 (Utah 1984) (equal protection rational basis 
analysis applies to review of rights guaranteed by Article I, 
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution). 
A statute may treat groups differently and still meet 
constitutional equal protection and access to the courts require-
ments if: (1) the law applies equally to all persons within a 
class; and (2) the statutory classifications and different 
treatment given the classes have a reasonable tendency to further 
the objectives of the statute. See Malan v. Lewis, supra, at 670. 
2. Access to Courts. 
Appellants have additionally challenged the statute of 
limitations under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
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These respondents do not believe, however, that the appellants' 
open court argument is applicable to the facts of this case. 
In essence, appellants' arguments simply speaks to the 
general question of whether there is denial of access to court 
when there is discovery of an injury after a statute of 
limitations has run, or when a minor does not have a parent or 
guardian willing or able to bring an action on his behalf. 
Appellant has avoided the application of the cited law to the 
facts in this case. This case is distinguishable from Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), since in this case 
there was discovery several years before the statute ran and 
parents were willing to, and in fact did, assert the minor child's 
claim. 
Appellants have argued that the status of "minority" 
deprives minors access to court. It is true that in injury cases 
involving minors, the claim will have to be brought on the child's 
behalf by his parent or guardian. However, it is not inequitable 
or improper to place some responsibility on parents or guardians 
to protect and preserve a minor's claim for an injury that 
accompanies a failure to diagnose or treat. After all, parents 
make daily choices during a child's minority which certainly 
affect the child's future. Parents choose, on the minor's behalf, 
the extent of medical intervention and treatment of a child's 
illnesses. The Utah Legislature recognized this responsibility by 
enacting § 78-14-4. 
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3. Application of Standard of Review. 
The statute of limitations of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, section 78-14-4, must be held to be a 
constitutional exercise of the Utah Legislature's prerogative 
unless appellants can clearly establish that the statute does not 
meet the two-part test of the rational basis standard of review. 
To meet that test the statute must, first, apply equally to all 
members of the created class. Malan v. Lewis, supra. The class 
created and protected by the Act is health care providers. See 
Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., supra at 31 ("The test 
. . . is whether there exists a rational basis to treat health 
care providers differently from other alleged tortfeasors 
. . . . " ) . Section 78-14-4 applies equally to all health care 
providers and therefore complies with the first prong of the 
rational basis test. The statute also treats equally the affected 
group, i.e., those persons including minors who have personal 
injury claims against health care providers. 
Second, to pass equal protection review the different 
treatment afforded the protected class must have a "reasonable 
tendency" to further the legislative objective. Malan v. Lewis, 
supra at 670. 
In Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., supra, the 
Utah Supreme Court reviewed the legislative objective behind the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act in upholding the Act and its 
statute of limitations against constitutional challenges. 
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It is therefore seen that the Act was 
premised upon the need to protect and insure the 
continued availability of health care services to 
the public, and not (as asserted by plaintiff) to 
shield insurance companies from legitimate claims. 
The legislature exercised its discretionary 
prerogative in determining that the shortening of 
the statute of limitations (along with requiring 
notice of intention to sue), would insure the 
continued availability of adequate health care 
services. 
635 P.2d at 32;X see Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1977). 
The Legislature properly recognized the need to treat 
medical malpractice claims differently from other general tort 
actions with respect to the operation of the statute of limita-
tions. Tolling a statute of limitations in a medical malpractice 
case would create an insurmountable problem of trying to determine 
the applicable standard of care long after the treatment and 
injury occur. Advances in knowledge and technology occur so 
rapidly in medicine that state-of-the-art treatment today is 
likely to be considered substandard in the very near future. It 
is unreasonable to assume that a court or jury can determine the 
applicable standard of care with any degree of fairness ten or 
fifteen years after the fact. It would be impossible for jurors 
to fairly assess the physician's actions based upon an ancient 
standard of care without taking into account their personal know-
ledge of advances which have occurred during the ensuing decades 
which make older techniques of treatment seem inappropriate. 
lrIhe Allen decision is cited by the court in Malan v. Lewis as 
supporting for the second prong of the equal protection — rational 
basis test. 693 P.2d at 670. 
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These practical problems of presenting a case more than six 
years old are compounded in this case since Chad is not only a minor 
but a mental incompetent. Even after Chad reaches majority he will 
still be unable and legally incompetent to make decisions concerning 
his own legal rights. He will remain unable to initiate legal 
proceedings in his own behalf. If one accepts appellants' argument 
that the statute of limitations should be tolled until an injured 
minor is competent to bring an action on his own behalf, the statute 
of limitations for a medical malpractice claim for Chad and others 
similarly situated may never commence to run, and an action on their 
behalf could be instituted decades after the cause of action 
arises. The potential liability of a health care provider and the 
exposure of his liability insurer in that situation becomes 
indefinite; the setting of insurance rates and reserves becomes an 
exercise in futility. It was the spectre of this unjust burden 
which led the Federal District Court for Utah to conclude: 
[T]he exclusion of minors and legally incompetent 
persons from the generally tolling provisions 
[Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36] is rationally related 
to the stated purpose of containing the 
malpractice insurance crisis. That rationality 
is particularly evidenced by the facts of the 
present case. Serious permanent injuries to 
children are often cases of large potential 
damages. If the period in which such claims 
could be brought were tolled until the young 
child reached the age of majority, a heavy burden 
would be placed on insurance carriers in 
evaluating and defending against the claim, 
establishing appropriate reserve requirements, 
and setting rates. The percentage of medical 
malpractice claims brought by minors is far from 
insignificant. Moreover, the uncertainty 
inherent in tolling the period in which such 
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claims may be brought could drastically affect 
insurance rates of at least this segment of 
health care providers that provide services 
exclusively to minors. 
Harqett v. Limberg, supra at 158. 
The federal court further stated that the burden of 
weighing the need to contain malpractice insurance costs and 
thereby to ensure the availability of health care services against 
the competing interests of minors and mental incompetents whose 
parents or guardians fail to timely initiate an action is a 
problem to be handled by the legislature, not the courts. Id. 
The reasons for leaving the balancing process to the legislature 
are important: 
Furthermore, any possible harm that may be 
suffered by a minor whose parents or guardians 
fail to initiate the action against a potential 
tortious wrongdoer within the appropriate time 
period may be outweighed by the chaos, 
uncertainty, and severe prejudice which will occur 
to those accused of tortious conduct, their 
insurance carriers, and ultimately to the 
insurance carriers' rate payers when lawsuits are 
permitted to be initiated decades after the 
occurrence of the incident giving rise thereto. 
Before such a sweeping change is made the question 
of "reserve requirements" imposed on insurance 
carriers and the resulting effect on insurance 
rates as well as many other issues must be 
addressed. The Legislature, not the courts, is 
the proper forum for the resolution of such issues. 
De Santis v. Yaw, 434 A.2d 1273, 1279 (Pa. 1981). 
Based upon the authorities cited above, appropriate 
principles of judicial review, and the legislative objectives 
behind the enactment of the Act and its statute of limitations, it 
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is clear that § 78-14-4 complies with state as well as federal 
guarantees of equal protection of laws and does not deny these 
appellants access to the courts. Other jurisdictions which have 
analyzed equal protection and due process attacks by minor 
plaintiffs against medical malpractice statutes of limitations 
have reached similar results. See, e.g., Donabedian v. Manzer, 
153 Cal. 3d 592 (1984); Kite v. Campbell, 14 Cal. 3d 793 (1983) 
(statute providing that medical malpractice action by a minor must 
be commenced within limitations and was properly dismissed); 
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980) 
(time limitation affecting medical malpractice claim for death of 
a minor child was not contrary to due process and equal 
protection); Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, supra (Ind. 1980) (court held 
that the legislature was not constitutionally mandated to suspend 
application of statutes of limitation in cases of infancy or 
incapacity and dismissed appeal which challenged constitution-
ality of statute of limitations of medical malpractice act). 
E. The Three Year Statute Of Limitations Covering Claims Of 
Fraud Or Mistake Also Bars Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
Plaintiffs' action is also barred by § 78-12-26(3) of the 
Utah Code Ann.: 
Within three years: (3) an action for relief on 
the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the 
cause of action in such case does not accrue 
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the 
facts constituting the fraud or mistake, 
(emphasis added) 
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The statute of limitations for actions for relief on the 
ground of fraud or mistake bars this action. Such actions must be 
brought within three years from the date the fraud or mistake is 
discovered. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3), supra. Further, the 
statute of limitations begins to run when a party has been 
informed of such facts as will put a person of ordinary intelli-
gence and prudence on inquiry. Gibson v. Jensen, 158 P. 426 (Utah 
1916). Finally, the statute bars both actions for fraud (Count I) 
and actions for negligent misrepresentation (Count II). See, e.g. 
Larsen v. Utah Loan and Trust Co., 65 P. 208 (Utah 1901). 
Plaintiffs allege that defendant Wetzel, through its 
employee Olsen, either intentionally or negligently misrepresented 
information about Chad's condition just prior to and up to the 
time of settlement. This allegation also goes to the heart of 
plaintiffs' complaint, which is that the settlement value was 
inadequate, and that the Atkinsons accepted the inadequate amount 
based upon their misunderstanding of Chad's condition. 
Assuming for purposes of argument that Olsen misrepre-
sented Chad's condition as not serious in order to induce them to 
settle, the crucial issue turns upon when plaintiffs learned that 
their child was brain damaged (i.e. the discovery of the fraud or 
misrepresentation). The latest date is July 22, 1983, when the 
court interviewed Roger and Polly Atkinson: 
THE COURT: What is the nature of the child's injury? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Brain damage. 
(R. 203) 
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In addition, the release, which plaintiffs signed shortly 
after the above statement was made, also states in unequivocal 
language that Chad Atkinson sustained injury and that such injury 
was or might be permanent and progressive. (R. 417) 
The Atkinsons knew they were getting nearly a million 
dollars because Chad was brain damaged. Further, when asked, Polly 
Atkinson could not produce any facts to demonstrate that defendant 
Wetzel or Olsen concealed anything. (R. 647 at p. 108) Finally, 
when defendant Olsen told Roger Atkinson and his father that they 
(plaintiffs) could get a lawyer, Roger's father indicated that they 
had seen a lawyer and they "didn't want to go to all the trouble." 
(R. 653 at p. 49) Plaintiffs also refused Olsen's offer to pay for 
additional testing for Chad. (R. 646 at p. 50) 
In accordance with Utah precedent, at the very latest 
plaintiffs admittedly had knowledge of the nature of the injury by 
the date of the hearing on July 22, 1983. They even refused to find 
out more about Chad's condition, to the extent that such knowledge 
was obtainable, by refusing the offer to have Chad tested further. 
Plaintiffs also disregarded the opportunity to get their own lawyer 
and hence to delve further into the settlement arrangement. 
The statute of limitations began to run on July 22, 1983. 
On that date both plaintiffs stated to the court that they 
understood both that Chad was brain damaged and that they would 
receive $900,000 from defendant IHC. Plaintiffs filed their 
complaint on July 26, 1987 a year and four days too late. 
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This action is barred either by the two-year medical 
malpractice statute of limitations, under which Scott Wetzel and its 
employee Olsen are health care providers, or by the three year 
period for actions claiming fraud or mistake. Justice would be well 
served, and legislative intent effectively upheld, if this Court 
sustains the lower Court's grant of defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL. 
In July of 1983, Roger, Polly, and Chad Atkinson, as well 
as Intermountain Health Care, went before the Third Judicial 
District Court for the County of Salt Lake for court approval of 
the settlement agreement. That court determined that the 
plaintiffs were satisfied with the agreement, and it approved the 
settlement. Six years later, the same parties are trying to 
resurrect the same issues before this Court. Plaintiffs' again 
seek money damages for Chad's condition. This action against 
Wetzel and Olsen is barred by the principle of collateral estoppel 
because the defendants, as agents, are in privity with the 
defendant IHC in the original matter, and because the same issue 
is involved. 
A. All Four Elements Of The Prevailing Test For Applying 
The Doctrine Of Collateral Estoppel Are Satisfied. 
Collateral estoppel prevents parties or their privies 
from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were 
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fully resolved in the first suit. Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 
P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978). A four part test is used to determine 
the applicability of the doctrine: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication identical with the one 
presented in the action in question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is 
asserted a party or in privity with a party 
to the prior adjudication? 
4. Was the issue in the first case competently, 
fully, and fairly litigated? 
Id. at 691. 
This action against Wetzel and Olsen clearly satisfies 
all four tests, and hence is barred by the principle of collateral 
estoppel. 
First, the issue in the prior action was decided and is 
identical to that which is being litigated in the present action. 
The issue was then, and is now, whether certain damages are 
adequate to cover Chad's condition. Further, an issue is 
"decided" if it was "essential to the resolution of the first 
suit." See Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983). 
Although the hearing was not an extensive trial, a final court 
order was issued after Judge Fishier questioned both plaintiffs. 
Final orders which determine the rights of parties (as did the 
Court's approval of a settlement agreement which released IHC and 
its agents and fixed an award amount) are sometimes included 
within the scope of "judgment." Brown v. Tubbs, 582 P.2d 1165 
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(Kan. App. 1978). The major purpose of the prior court evaluation 
and appraisal of the settlement agreement was to determine whether 
the financial payments sufficiently compensated plaintiffs for 
Chad's condition. 
Second, there was a final judgment. After asking 
questions of Roger and Polly Atkinson, the court specifically 
ordered the parents, as conservators, were authorized to accept 
the settlement offer as set forth in their petition. In addition, 
the court ordered all claims by Chad Atkinson against 
Intermountain Health Care could be released. (R. 423) 
Third, Wetzel and Olsen are privies to IHC in the prior 
action. The legal definition of a person in privity with another, 
is a person so identified in interest with another that he 
represents the same legal right. Searle Bros., supra at 691. Not 
only are agents Wetzel and Olsen "identified in interest" with IHC 
in this case, the three parties had, and have, identical 
interests, viz. that the court's approval of the settlement 
agreement be obtained, and once obtained, upheld. 
Fourth, and finally, the issue of appropriate damages was 
competently, fully and fairly resolved. The fourth element is 
satisfied if the parties "receive notice reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances to apprise them of the pendency of the 
action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections." Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah App. 1987). 
Plaintiffs were actually present in the courtroom. The court 
asked them numerous questions involving their knowledge of and 
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feeling about the crucial issue of whether the settlement was 
fair. (R. 203-208) In addition, the court after due 
investigation found the settlement agreement to be fair in all 
respects. (R. 426, "said settlement in all respects is fair"). 
The four requirements for the application of the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel to the issue of adequate damages are 
satisifed. 
B. The Doctrine Of Collateral Estoppel May Be Applied 
To Final Judgments Based On Settlement Agreements. 
Plaintiffs' contention that the lack of the fullblown 
trial precludes application of collateral estoppel is erroneous. 
The "actually litigated" standard upon which plaintiffs relies 
really serves to distinguish collateral estoppel (where the issue 
must actually have been brought up to be estopped) from res 
judicata (where even claims that are not discussed at all may be 
merged or barred). Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, the 
"actually litigated" standard does not stand for the proposition 
that only issues determined after a lengthy trial are barred; if 
that were the case, compromises and settlements would be useless, 
which is simply not the policy of the law. The law favors the 
resolution of controversies and uncertainties through compromise 
and settlement rather than through litigation. See, e.g., Fieser 
v. Stinnett, 509 P.2d 1156 (Kan. 1973). 
In concert with the law's favorable opinion of settlement 
agreements, there exists a specific caveat that a settlement 
assented to by all parties in interest is ordinarily final, 
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conclusive, and is binding upon them as contract and as if terms 
were embodied in judgment. Theis v. Theis, 135 N.W.2d 740, 744 
(Minn. 1965) (emphasis supplied). See also Corbett v. Combined 
Communications Corp. of Oklahoma, Inc., 654 P.2d 616 (Okla. 1982) 
(holding that an executed agreement of settlement is as conclusive 
against a party seeking to avoid it as the final judgment of a 
court of competent jurisdiction). Finally, Utah courts apply the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel to an issue formerly dispensed 
with in a final judgment even if, as plaintiffs' alleges, claims 
for relief are different in the two actions. See Penrod v. NU 
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983). 
In this case the settlement was approved by the Court on 
July 22, 1983. Plaintiffs were before the Court, responded to 
questions by the Court relating to the settlement, and fully 
consented to the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs had also 
participated in extensive negotiations prior to settlement and 
attended numerous meetings with representatives of IHC, including 
Olsen. Application of collateral estoppel to the issue of 
sufficient damages requires that there be notice to plaintiffs and 
opportunity to be heard. These requirements were fully 
satisfied. The issue of damages is therefore barred and 
plaintiffs should not be allowed to relitigate it. 
CONCLUSION 
This action is barred by a court-approved release. The 
release was read aloud to plaintiffs, was signed by them, and 
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plaintiffs represented that they understood that Chad's injury 
might be permanent and progressive, and that if Chad's condition 
worsened they could not bring any claim against IHC or its 
agents. The release, for which consideration of nearly a million 
dollars plus the payment of future medical expenses was given, 
expressly bars any and all claims resulting from the March 1983 
incident. Plaintiffs should not be allowed to simply disregard 
the terms of the contract, especially since they have chosen not 
to rescind it and instead have retained its benefits. 
As agents of IHC, the complaint against Wetzel and its 
employee Olsen is also barred by either the two- or three-year 
statute of limitations. On July 22, 1983 these plaintiffs 
testified before the court that they knew their child had brain 
damage. They refused defendants' offer for further testing. This 
action, which turns upon Chad's condition as a result of an 
accident in March 1983, is barred by the application of either the 
medical malpractice statute of limitations or the fraud and deceit 
statute of limitations. 
Finally, plaintiffs should not be allowed to relitigate 
the crucial and identical issue in both cases regarding what 
amount of damages was sufficient to compensate the Atkinsons for 
Chad's injury. The issue of appropriate damages for Chad's 
condition as a result of the March 1983 accident has been fully 
and fairly decided by a court order declaring the settlement to be 
fair and bestowing upon the plaintiffs the authority to accept the 
July 1983 settlement. Extensive negotiations and discussions 
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about the issue of appropriate damages went on between plaintiffs 
and defendants prior to the conservatorship hearing. At that 
hearing, all parties agreed to settle on a certain amount. 
Plaintiffs now seek additional damages for Chad's condition. 
Application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars 
relitigation of this issue. 
Despite plaintiff's allegations of fraud and misrepre-
sentation, there is no material dispute. The uncontested facts 
demonstrate that plaintiffs knew Chad's condition; they knew the 
value of the settlement; they knew they were barred from further 
claims against defendants; they participated in extensive 
negotiations with defendants and even offered a counter-proposal 
drafted by Roger Atkinson's father; and finally, plaintiffs 
refused defendants offer to pay for further testing. As a matter 
of law, the present complaint is barred by application of any one 
of three doctrines. Accordingly, the lower court's summary 
judgment for defendants should be upheld. 
DATED this I day of August, 1989. 
RAY, Q^JIWEY & NEfeEKER 
ml— 
Attorneys for Scott Wetzel 
Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen 
0054C 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; FRIDAY, JULY 2 2 , 1983; 9:30 A.M. 
-o0o~ 
THE COURT: This is P-83-692, In the Matter of Chad 
Atkinson, a Minor. / 
MR. MORGAN: Steven Morgan representing them. 
THE COURT: And your name, ma'am? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Polly Atkinson. 
(Polly Atkinson and Roger W. Atkinson were duly sworn.) 
THE COURT: You are here to seek the approval of the 
court to settle a claim of your minor child? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And this is the child here? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: And you are the mother of the child? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And the gentleman holding the child is your 
husband and the child's father; is that correct? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you believe you have a claim against 
Intermountain Health Care? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: What's the nature of the child's injury? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Brain damage. 






















case, and regardless of what later transpires, when you find 
out later that the child's injury is worse than you antici-
pated
 f and on the other hand even if it's better, that you 
will not ever be able to come back against Intermountain 
Health Care? Do you understand that? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes, sir, I do. 
THE COURT: Have you sought the advice of legal counsel 
in this matter? 
MRS, ATKINSON: I 'have talked to someone about it, but 
we are not planning on getting a lawyer. 
THE COURT: Have you talked to a lawyer? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes. I've just asked him a few things 
about it, and he said that we really should not — we 
shouldn't have to sue them if they are giving us an offer. 
THE COURT: Well, what's your understanding of the 
offer? 
MRS. ATKINSON: That he would be taken care of both 
medical, financial, his education. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that this provides for 
monthly payments? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that it will be — you 
will get $500 per month, or $6,000 a year? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes, sir, I do. 
THE COURT: What about a bond, Mr. Morgan? 
M c. MORGAN: They are seeking appr n i UiL ;.d. 
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Good 1u c k t o y o u f o1k s 
(Procedings. were concluded 
CONTRACT BETWEEN IHC AND WETZEL SERVICES, INC. 
A G R E E M E N T 
AGREEMENT, made and entered into this /p -~~ day of 
77k^^, Lf__ 19fi^ , by and between Intermountaln Health Care, Inc., 
a Utah corporation (hereinafter referred to as flIHCM) with its 
principal place of business at 36 South State Street, Floor 22, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and Scott Wetzel Services, Inc.,, a 
Washington corporation (hereinafter referred to as "SWS'1) with 
its principal place of business at 500 Pacific Avenue, Bremerton, 
Washington 98310: 
TT T U 
WHEREAS, IHC maintains a self-insured plan to cover its 
general and professional liability (malpractice) and workers1 
compensation exposures; and SWS has agreed to perform certain 
services in connection therewith, as herein set: forth: 
NOW, THEREFORE, I t I s agreed as fol 1 ows: 
1. "This Agreement shall become effective January 1, 1 981 , ai id 
shall remain in full force and effect indefinitely until 
terminated by either party giving not less than sixty (60) 
days written advance notice of such termination to the other 
party 
2, During the period or periods of this Agreement, SWS shall 
represent and act for IHC in matters pertaining to the gen-
eral, professional, and workersf compensation liabilities 
of IHC for claims based on events which occur during the 
term or terms of this Agreement. During the term hereof, 
SWS shall devote its best efforts in the conduct of its 
duties hereunder, Such duties shall be the following: 
(a) Receive notice of and create files on each claim 
reported and maintain these files for IHC, 
(b) Invest! gate all claims as required to determine their 
validl ty and compensability to negotiate and close 
settlements wherever possible. 
(c) Determine proper benefits and relalvil i-spiii1 ".  iln > r. 
compensable cases. 
Cd) Make timely payment of benefits due and other claim 
expenses, in accord with payment procedures as estab-
lished from funds provided by IHC. IHC will be wholly 
•responsible for providing such funds as may be required 
for these payments. 
{(j) Prepare documentation and defense of cases considered 
non-compensable, represent IHC at State and Federal 
agencies, and assist selected legal counsel in prepar-
ation of cases for hearings, appeals, and/or trial. 
(f) Maintain and provide IHC pertinent data c ri a 1 3 :::] an in 
and expense payments 
(g) Provide monthly and/or quarterly computerized loss re-
ports in a tailored format, as mutually agreed at incep-
tion of the program, showing descriptive data, details 
of each month's payments, total payments, reserves and 
total experience for each claim, 
(h) Provide excess insurers T^ reports as they 
may reasonably require. 
(i) Provide information and assistance as may be required 
for preparation and filing of all reports required by 
State and Federal agencies in connection with IHCfs 
approved self-insured status. This provision assumes 
IHC will report workers' compensation cases to SWS in 
compliance with state law. 
( ]) File with appropriate governmental agencies sue-, i: . r-
mation as is required on each claim. 
SWS will be responsible for handling all general and profes-
sional liability claims within the metropolitan zone (defined 
as Salt Lake and Weber Counties), IHC will be responsible 
for handling all liability claims outside the metropolitan 
zone, but may assign these claims to SWS as desired. Any 
such claims assigned to SWS will be charged at the rates out-
lined in paragraph four (4) of the Agreement. 
In consideration of the service u; e performed by SWS here-
under, IHC shall pay to SWS a fee of sixty dollars ($60) per 
workers' compensation claim and three hundred fifty dollars 
($350) per liability claim. There will be a minimum annual 
fee of ninety-six thousand, dollars ($96,000), to be paid in 
equal monthly payments. 
Billing for claims over and above the minimum annual fee will 
be submitted based upon the cumulative claim count as required 
by section 2(g) of the Agreement 
Actual travel expenses for any general and professional lia-
bility claim requiring travel outside the metropolitan zone 
will be reimbursed to SWS. 
Attorneys1 fees, court and/or hearing costs, costs of deposi-
tions, documents and exhibits, witness and expert fees, med-
ical and engineering appraisal, surveillance, photography 
and other incidental and special costs incurred to evaluate 
compensability of claims shall be at the expense of IHC. 
6 All claims and related files generated by SWS as a result of 
its activity under this plan shall remain at all times the 
property of IHC with the exception of any supporting data 
required by SWS to make such accountings to IHC or excess 
insurers as are required I n this Agreement. 
SWS is retained by IHC only for the purposes and to the 
extent set forth in this Agreement, and its relationship 
to IHC shall be t! lat: of an I ndependent contractor. 
8. IHC agrees during the term of this Agreement and for a period 
of one (1) year following its termination it will not employ 
any person employed by SWS during the term,, of thl s Agreement 
without the written consent of SWS, 
9. IHC agrees to indemnify and to hold SWS harmless from and 
against any and all claims, actions, expense, losses, lia-
bilities, damages, penalties, costs, and demand whatsoever, 
together with counsel fees and expenses arising out of the 
business conducted by IHC and which are occasioned by IHCfs 
failure to perform according to this Agreement. 
10. SWS agrees to indemnify and to hold IHC harmless from and 
against any and all claims, actions, expense, losses, lia-
bilities, damages, penalties, costs and demand whatsoever, 
together with counsel fees and expenses, arising out of 
activities of SWS and which are occasioned by the negligent 
or intentional acts, or omissions, of SWS. 
11. Any notice required or perinitted to be given under this 
Agreement shall be sufficient if given in writing and sent 
by registered or certified mail to IHC or to SWS at the 
addresses first set forth above or to any other address cf 
which written notice of change is given. 
12. The waiver by SWS .. . ^HC of the breach of any provision of 
this Agreement by the other party shall not operate or be 
construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach by either 
party or prevent either party thereafter enforcing any such 
provision. 
13. Upon termination of this Agreement SWS shall, at IKCf s option, 
continue to supervise and report to IHC on all claims based 
• on events which occurred during the terms of the Agreement 
prior to its termination, until such tine as the disposition 
of such claims is completed 
14. This Agreement sets forth all of the terms., conditions, and 
agreements of the parties relative to the subject matter 
hereof and supersedes any and all former agreements with 
respect thereto; and any and all such former agreements are • 
hereby declared terminated and of no further force and effect 
- 4 -
upon the execution and delivery hereof. There are no terms, 
conditions, or agreements with respect thereto, except as 
herein provided and no amendment or modification of this 
Agreement shall be effective unless reduced to writing and 
executed by the parties. 
15. Governing Law: The construction, interpretation, and per-
formance of~Th is contract and all transactions under it 
shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this 
Agreement as of the date first above written. 




SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC. 
ATTEST: 
L^M/ll CL ^ ft-7 
Tit le Vice President 
V 
The Agreement effective January 1, 1981 by and between 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (IHC) and Scott Wetzel Services, 
Inc. (SWS) to v;hich this Amendment is attached is by this 
instrument modified as fellows, effective July 1, 1982: 
1. Paragraph 2 (i). Delete the last sentence, which 
reads, ''This prevision assumes IKC will report 
Workers' Compensation cases to SWS in compliance 
with state law." 
Substitute the following paragraph, "At IHCfs 
option these Workers' Compensation claims having 
a total compensable value under One Hundred Dollars 
($100) may be self-administered by IHC. Such self-
administered claims will be directly reported to 
the state authorities by IHC and not through SWS. 
IHC will be responsible for compliance with state, 
federal, and local law in the processing of self-
administered claims. All other Workers' Compensa-
tion claims will be reported to SWS for handling." 
2. Paragraph 2 (j). Delete the existing sentence. 
Substitute, "File with appropriate governmental 
agencies such information as required on each claim 
processed by SWS. 
3. Paragraph 4. The prior paragraph will remain in 
effect through June 30, 1982. For claims reported 
to SWS after June 30, 1982, IHC shall pay to"SWS a 
fee of Ninety Dollars ($90) per Workers' Compensa-
tion claim and Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350) 
per Liability claim. There will be a minimum annual 
fee of Eighty Four Thousand Dollars ($84,000) to be 
paid in equal monthly installments, effective 
July 1, 1982. The combined minimum fee for 1982 is 
Ninety thousand Dollars ($90,000). The first six 
months is Forty Eight Thousand Dollars ($48,000), 
the second six months Forty Two Thousand Dollars 
($42,000). The second and third paragraphs of 
Paragraph 4 remain in effect. 
It is further agreed that a value of Ten Thousand 
Dollars ($10,000) is to be placed upon past and 
future work done by IHC on pre-1981 Liability 
claims. This work was performed after December 31, 1980 
by IHC. SWS will credit IHC Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000) for this work. 
amendment Pace 2 
4. Paragraph 13. Add the following, "This paragraph 
applies only to those claims reported to and 
processed by SWS under this Agreement." 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this 
Aareement. 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC. 
Date S i a n e d : 
> 
ATTEST: 





Sidney 6. /Garrett 
T i t l e : Vice President 
SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC, 
/ 
D a t e S i g n e d : 
9TU/IA 19J /f^2- By: 
ATTEST: 
v 44L 
Title: Executive Vice President 
A M E N D M E N T 
This agreement effective January 1, 1981 and subsequently amended through a 
transmittal letter, an amendment dated March 19, 1982 by and between Inter-
mountain Health Care, Inc., a Utah corporation (hereinafter referred to as 
IHC) with its principal place of business at 36 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, and Scott Wetzel Services Inc., a Washington corpor-
ation (hereinafter referred to as SWS), with its principal place of business 
at 500 Pacific Avenue, Bremerton, Washington 98310, herewith agree to the 
modification listed below, to be effective on a retroactive basis to 
January 1, 1983. 
Paragraph four originally called for a minimum annual fee of $96,000, to be 
paid in equal monthly payments. Through the aforementioned amendment, the 
nimimum annual fee to be reduced to $84,000, to be paid in equal monthly 
installments, effective July 1, 1982. Effective January 1, 1983, the minimum 
annual fee is reduced to $70,000, payable in equal monthly payments. It is 
agreed that appropriate adjustments in billings will reflect the new terms 
and conditions outlined in this amendment. 
ATTEST* 




SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC. 
By_ 
Title Executive Vice President 
-^U *M* 
